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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
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The Baltic states are the first former Soviet republics that will join the project of 
European unification. They will even be the first new members of the EU with 
unsettled questions with Russia. All of the three Baltic states have declared that 
membership in the EU is only a partial solution to their present political goals - the 
full solution being memberships both in the EU and Nato. There are a number of 
internal as well as external factors linked with the Baltic states due to which the 
Baltic enlargement of the EU will undoubtedly bring a new political dimension to the 
EU agenda.
The Baltic enlargement, as a part of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, will 
pose great challenges to the EU as well as to the new Member States themselves. In 
this presentation I will focus upon the political challenges of the Baltic enlargement. 
Most of these political challenges originate in the immediate history of the Baltic 
states as an annexed part of the Soviet Union. They can, however, be divided into 
two groups on the basis of whether the historical conditions reflect themselves in 
their political thinking and identity or in social and political structures. A third 
group of political challenges will consist of those changes that the Baltic enlargement 
will bring to the EU system concerning its borders and territory as well as its 
political institutions.
This discussion dealing with the political challenges of the Baltic enlargement 
of the EU is not in any case meant to understate the political value of the EU 
enlargement and has therefore to be put into its proper framework. The spread of the 
project of European integration into the Central and Eastern European new 
democracies has constituted one of the self-given dimensions of integration since the 
beginning of the 1990's. Any critical evaluations related to the enlargement almost 
without exception deal with its various details purporting to contribute to the better 
adaptation of the EU to the enlargement project. The purpose of this criticism is not 
to question itself the enlargement.
The division of the Baltic States into two groups as far as the enlargement 
strategy of the EU is concerned will not be addressed in this article whose core 




























































































In the stable system of the Cold War subjective factors like national identities did not 
seem to have much importance as far as the explanation of foreign policies was 
concerned. It appeared as if systemic factors, factors connected with the bipolar 
division of powers as the backbone of the international system, could explain a major 
part of the states’ international action. In the 1990's, that has usually been 
characterised as a period of transition in international politics, a return to national 
identities has been necessary in order to cope with the vast changes that have made 
themselves evident after the collapse of the Cold War system1.
The concept of national identity refers to the political self-understanding o f a 
nation as an important basis for its policy and political choices. A national identity is 
not, as it is usually believed, a unitary phenomenon. It is based upon a number of 
historical and cultural traditions the interpretation and application of which vary from 
context to context. As a basis for a foreign policy, national identities express 
themselves as worldviews, that is, as subjective interpretations concerning the 
international environment and one’s own position in it. These worldviews 
furthermore express a set of values functioning as the value basis for a given policy.
The key characteristics of the Baltic identities can, consequently, be used 
when it comes to the understanding of their foreign policies and, at a later stage, of 
their policies and position as a part of an integrated Europe. The most important 
aspect of the Baltic national identities is formed by their ways of conceptualising 
their statehood. The Balts had never consented themselves to the annexation of their 
territories to the Soviet Union. It was seen as an illegal act the consequence of which 
being that the Balts believed in the existence of their statehood throughout the 
occupation2. This belief was strengthened by the non-recognition policies of a 
majority of the Western states as far as the valid title of the Soviet Union over the 
Baltic territories was concerned.
The refusal of accepting an interruption in their statehood has formed the key 
basis for all Baltic policies after the restoration of their full sovereignties in the 
1990's. The Baltic countries have applied for membership in all of the key Western 
institutions, not on the basis of a more or less instrumental logic and reasoning, but 
on the basis of their political identities and historical position on the Western 
political map3. An Estonian expert, Toivo Klaar, has even claimed that the 
restoration of the Estonian independence was never seen as a goal in itself by those 
involved in the liberation movement. According to him its was seen as an important 
step on the path from being a colony of the USSR to becoming an equal partner in an





























































































The cultural and historical right to Westemity, including a place in the 
Western institutions, does not only explain the speed in which the new Baltic 
policies were formulated, it even explains the firm determination in which these 
claims have been introduced to the Western community. The two Baltic states that 
fell out of the first round of enlargement were among the most obstinate critiques of 
the Commission proposal and refered to the political character of the decision as 
well as to the outdated economic statistics that had been used3. As membership in 
the EU is perceived in terms of belonging to a cultural and historical unity it is much 
more difficult to consent to the differentiation of the three Baltic states in this respect 
than if it were seen in pure economic terms.
Another important basis for the Baltic foreign policies is formed by the high 
level of unsecurity that is connected with the Baltic states and their territories. The 
Baltic conceptualisation of threats and security policy objectives differs from the 
post-Cold War security policy discourse in a majority of the West-European 
countries. While crises management and prevention has become the main content of 
Western security policy in the 1990’s, the Balts still count on the probability of a 
territorial threat scenario, where their state structures are threatened by Russia. The 
high value put on traditional national security is another element that pushes the 
Baltic states towards the Western institutions. The conception of security is also the 
element that explains why the Balts are still more interested in a membership in Nato 
despite of the fact that membership in the EU undoubtedly would lead to much 
firmer ties and interdependence with the Western community6. As long as the Balts, 
however, are reasoning in terms of traditional security the EU appears to be weak for 
their purposes as it does not include any guarantees for the territorial security of its 
members.
On the basis of these political identities, that can be treated as common to the 
three Baltic States, we can say something about the challenges they will bring to the 
project of European integration. Treating membership in the Western community as 
their historical right they will certainly form a group of applicants which are prepared 
to struggle hard for their memberships and which, on the other hand, won’t be 
pleased with any other solution than full membership. Once in the European Union, 
the Baltic Countries will do their best in order to qualify for a place in the hard core, 
whether political or economic, of the EU. The Baltic States, at least if their 
memberships in Nato will be further postponed, could even be counted to those EU 
members that are willing to build a collective security system of some genre in the 




























































































The Baltic integration into the Western security structures appears in a slightly 
different light if seen from a Russian perspective. It is just this conflict of 
conceptions which, when politicised, has given reason for a deep mistrust between 
the Baltic States on the one hand and Russia on the other. Therefore, because of its 
importance for the situation in general, the conflict shall be briefly analysed here 
even as far as the Russian interpretation is concerned.
Russian political elites, for their part do not admit their guilty to the fate of 
Baltic States in connection with the war. They refer to the fact that it was the Soviet 
Union and its communist regime, and not Russia, that stood behind this policy7. The 
goal of the Russian leadership as far as the new security system is concerned is to 
create a multipolar world. This would be a world where Russia, together with other 
great powers like the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, 
maintains an international balance of power.
Russia treats Nato as a relic from the Cold War which is very badly in conflict 
with its vision of the new order and works, instead, in favour of a continuing U.S. 
hegemony. The enlargement of Nato is, according to the most extreme Russian 
interpretation, seen as a project that purports to isolate Russia and surround it with 
antagonistic alliances. As a great power Russia considers itself, in any case, entitled 
to certain spheres of interest to which it counts even the Baltic States. This position 
can not in any situation be accepted by the Balts - a fact that creates a deep cleavage 
between the parties.
The Russian conception of the European Union differs remarkably from its 
view of Nato. In spite of the reinforcement of its security policy dimension the EU is 
not perceived as a threat to Russia which, consequently, does not oppose its 
enlargement. The problem is that due to their expectations concerning security 
guarantees the present EU is not regarded as a sufficient solution by the Baltic 
States, either.
History Appears in Social and Political Structures
Another political challenge that the EU will face in connection with the Baltic 
enlargement relates to the currently unsettled problems between the Baltic States and 
Russia. These problems, even if settled, will include a high risk of conflict between 
the parties. Russia has been willing to link the two problems, that is, border 
agreements with the Baltic states and the rights of the Russian minorities in the




























































































Baltic states, while the Balts have emphasised them as separate issues.
When the EU will be enlarged to the Baltic States it will get extensive Russian 
minorities into its territory. These are minorities whose position and welfare have 
been declared as an immediate Russian interest. The Russian minorities or then- 
position do not, from a legal point of view, constitute a problem for the EU. In its 
Opinions upon the applicant countries’ capacity to fulfill the conditions for 
membership the Commission confirmed that all the three Baltic countries present the 
characteristics of a democracy with stable institutions, guaranteeing the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities8. As far as Estonia and 
Lithuania were concerned the Commission, however, demanded them to accelerate 
the rate of naturalization of Russian-speaking non-citizens in order to enable them to 
become better integrated to the society.
From a political point of view the large Russian minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia, a great deal of which are lacking a Baltic citizenship, do form a great 
challenge to the EU9. At the general level this means that the issue of Russian 
minorities and their position will enter into the political relations between the EU and 
the Russia, being able to affect these relations in good and bad. Through the 
reinforced position of fundamental rights in the EU, and the new capacity given to 
the European Court of Justice to control the application of these rights, issues related 
to the Russian minorities will be apt to get a firm status on the EU agenda10.
The Russian minorities lacking a Baltic citizenship will constitute a challenge 
to the EU even as far as the EU Citizenship and its further development is 
concerned. First, Russian minorities lacking a Baltic citizenship will belong to those 
groups of people living in the EU area that are not entitled to Union citizenship or to 
the evolving political and economic rights that are vested with it. At this stage, they 
will be lacking both the right to free movement in the EU area as well as the political 
rights: the right to vote or to stand as a candidate in EP or municipal elections in the 
Member State in which one resides. The Russian minorities will constitute an 
additional element strengthening the criticism against the EU citizenship according to 
which the EU citizenship reinforces the division of people living in the EU area into 
different categories. This increasing criticism against the basic conditions of the EU 
citizenship will be apt to aggravate the development of EU citizenship and an 
enlargement of it to new political and social rights.
The long and difficult process related to border agreements between the 
individual Baltic States and Russia is another good example of the Russian 




























































































end when these states will enter into the European Union. This far, the EU has 
adopted a neutral attitude towards this specific dispute - the necessity of a valid 
border agreement with Russia has not been demanded by the EU as a condition for 
EU membership. It is unclear what the Russian policy in this respect will be after the 
Baltic States have entered into the EU - whether Russia will be discouraged to 
continue its maneuvres against the Baltic States or whether it, on the opposite, feels 
it has still much more to gain of this kind of politics when the counterpart is the 
European Union. It is, however, clear that once the Baltic States are in the Union 
relations between the Baltic States and Russia will form a potential area of tension 
between the EU and a third state.
The Baltic States as a Part of the Developing EU
In addition to those political challenges that emanate directly from the Baltic history 
the Baltic enlargement of the EU will pose other challenges related to the general 
political, and geopolitical, characteristics of this enlargement. The first question to be 
asked in this connection is whether we can talk about ‘ a Baltic enlargement’ that is, 
whether there is reason to assume that the Baltic States, once having entered the EU, 
will form a unitary subgroup of it".
In spite of the active co-operation that has taken place between the Baltic 
States in the 1990’s there are some crucial differences in their political orientations 
that might work against their unity. Due to historical and cultural reasons, Lithuania 
has been more oriented towards Poland, and might see this as a useful relationship 
even in the EU, whereas Germany has formed the most important Central-European 
contact for Estonia and Latvia12. A division of the same type has taken place as far 
as the Nordic orientation of the Baltic States is concerned. For historical and cultural 
reasons, Estonia has been most active in its relations with Finland, Latvia with 
Sweden and Lithuania with Denmark. It is also a common assumption that as 
members of the EU, the Baltic States would see more advantage in close relations 
with the Western European than with the Nordic members of the EU13.
The Baltic enlargement of the EU would, undoubtedly, strengthen the position 
and powers of the northern members of the EU in a simple north-south constellation. 
In spite of their differences, the Baltic States share with other Northern European 
members like Finland, the same concerns related to their location in the outskirts of 
the united Europe, in the immediate neighbourhood of an unstable Russia and with a 
long common border with it. At present, the Baltic States, however, have not given 
their full support to the evolving programme known as ‘The Northern Dimension’ 




























































































European and global structures through increased cooperation. As the emphasis of 
the programme lies on energy networks, transport and trade and commercial co­
operation it has been criticised in the Baltic States for overriding the Baltic position 
related to these fields of co-operation with Russia14.
Next, the implications of a Baltic enlargement of the EU shall be discussed in 
three contexts. These are the borders and territorium of the EU, the political 
institutions of the EU and EU’s common foreign and security policy.
The Baltic Enlargement and the Common EU Territory
When the Baltic States become a part of the common EU territory, that is, a part of 
the single market and the unification of external borders, there are some issues that 
will be raised into focus. The first is the detail, that was already mentioned, of a 
great deal of the population in Estonia and Latvia remaining without access to the 
single market. The second is the position of the Baltic States as border countries, or 
gate-keepers, to the EU. The third is the expected activity of the Balts to use the 
common labour market of the EU - the extent to which the Balts will seek their way 
to other EU countries.
The total number of population in all the three Baltic States being only around 
seven million the pressure that they will cause to the common labour markets can not 
be considered very remarkable. Another detail reinforcing this assumption is the 
level of unemployment that starts to get stabilised in the Baltic area.
The gate-keeper’s position of the Baltic States is a more challenging issue for 
the EU. As the external borders of the EU, the Baltic eastern borders should be 
controlled tightly while the abolishing of the border controlling from internal borders 
should be compensated for by new strategies, and most importantly, by co-operation 
between different security agencies. At present, the gravest problems concerning 
border control seem to be directed to the Latvian and Lithuanian border controlling 
capabilities15. The problems, most often, originate in a lack of resources and reflect 
themselves for instance in a huge number of illegal migrants using the Baltic States 
as their passage to the West. In Latvia, the most problematic border concerning 
smuggling, contraband and illegal border crossing seem to be that with Belarus, due 
to the more efficient guarding of the Russian side16. Even Lithuania has most 
problems with its border with Belarus.
The state of the Baltic border control as well as the creation of a proper 
legislation concerning the treatment of illegal immigrants and refugees is in the 
immediate interest of the EU. The EU’s provisions concerning immigrants and 




























































































condition that national legislations in this area are compatible.
The Baltic Enlargement and the Political Institutions o f the EU
The Eastern enlargement, in general, is a great challenge to the political institutions 
of the EU and as a consequence of this, a number of institutional amendments are 
being put into effect (Amsterdam Treaty) or, at least, are being planned. The 
challenges resulting from the Baltic enlargement, in particular, relate themselves to 
the sizes of the Baltic States and, why not, to the three different languages they will 
bring to the EU’s political and administrative machinery.
The Baltic States will, with their national parameters, belong to the smallest 
members of the European Union. Already expectations of their future memberships 
will increase the pressure towards the structure of the Commission as well as 
towards the voting system, and the system of EU Presidency, related to the Council 
of Ministers. The Baltic States, of course, are not alone in accelerating institutional 
reforms in the EU. They, however, become to those newcomers that the current 
system prevailing would transfer the powers of the EU decisively from its big 
members to the small ones.
Expectations of the coming Eastern enlargement, and the increasing number of 
small EU states that it will lead to, have already caused a confrontation between the 
present large and small members of the EU. The large members have ended up to a 
proposal, where the number of Commissioners would be separated from the number 
of Member States and where the Commission would be developed to the direction of 
an effective European government17. Small members have insisted on their right to a 
Commissioner, which they have treated as a necessary element for the legitimacy of 
the whole organ.
As far as the Council of Ministers is concerned, the large Member States are 
afraid of losing their dominant position in connection with the Eastern enlargement. 
One of the concrete propositions made aiming at the balancing of the situation is the 
German proposition, according to which a system of double majority should be 
started to be used in Council decision-making, referring to a majority based both on 
the previous majority of votes and upon a new majority of inhabitants. Another 
reform that, due to the same reasons, has been proposed to the Council of Ministers 
relates to the system of Council Presidency, a powerful task that currently is rotating 
between the fifteen members. Ideas have been put forth about a more limited access 
to Presidency given to smaller Member States. These questions will be solved in an 




























































































As far as institutional amendments are concerned, the Baltic States are not in a 
position different from the one of the other newcomers. It is, however, more or less 
evident that their small size and modest political prestige will be used as heavy 
arguments in favour of the acceleration of the institutional reforms. It can be 
objectively doubted whether their developing political system and administration for 
a long time could bear the burdens for instance of an EU Presidency. The same could 
be said as far as the Presidency’s role in external relations, and in the representation 
of the EU in international organisations, is concerned.
Last, but not least, the Baltic States will bring to the EU three different 
languages which all according to the present rales, are entitled to the position of an 
official language of the EU. The Baltic enlargement could thus function as an 
ultimate stimulus to a reform of the EU in this respect, in the form of a transfer to a 
limited number of working languages, if not a decision upon this has been taken 
earlier.
The Baltic Enlargement and the CFSP
The challenges that the new Baltic members pose to the common foreign and 
security policy of the European Union are most of all linked with the firm aspirations 
that these countries have for Nato’s security guarantees. The present EU Members 
for instance are concerned about the willingness of the new non-Nato EU Members 
to cooperate for the development of the CFSP which, they feel, is seen only a 
transitional stage on their road to Nato18.
The enlargement of the EU to new non-Nato countries, like the Baltic 
countries, has belonged to those factors which have created pressures towards the 
role of the Western European Union in between the EU and Nato19. A new 
membership category ‘ Associate Partnership’ was created to the WEU for Central 
and East-European countries. This membership category enabled these countries to 
get involved in the political and operational activities of the WEU with, however, a 
clear difference to the rights of full members (members of EU and Nato), associate 
members (Nato but not EU members) or observers (EU but not Nato members). The 
Maastricht Treaty still included a declaration on Western European Union 
(Declaration 30, II) according to which States which are members o f the European 
Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with 
Article XI o f the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers i f  they so wish. 
The abolishment of this formulation from the Amsterdam Treaty reflects a concern 





























































































The propositions concerning the precision of the WEU’s role, and related to 
the enlargement of the EU, have varied from the separation of WEU’s tasks in crises 
management and those in collective defence to the abolishment of the whole 
organisation20. The former purports to enable a full participation of the non-Nato 
members of the EU in the crises management tasks of the WEU without making 
them a part of the WEU’s security guarantees. The latter would lead to the same 
result by clarifying the institutional labyrinth between the three organisations. 
Participation in EU’s crises management tasks, which in this model would be put 
into effect by Nato directly, and security guarantees would be two separate things.
In addition to this tension concerning the institutional development of the 
CFSP the Baltic enlargement will be apt to increase the weight of Russia in this 
policy-area. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU was given some new instruments for 
the treatment of its major foreign relations. The category of a common strategy was 
established to function as a general policy framework for important foreign policy 
areas and ‘a Russian strategy’ is already being prepared in this framework in order 
to become the first common strategy of the CFSP. Relations between the Baltic 
States and Russia will later on form one of the major single elements included in this 
strategy. Secondly, in the Amsterdam Treaty the EU was giving a limited treaty 
making capacity in the area of foreign and security policy. This is another capacity 
that might very well be needed for instance when Kaliningrad will become a Russian 
enclave in the EU.
Conclusions
The Baltic enlargement will bring totally new political challenges to the European 
Union. The challenges are related to the borders, minorities and political parameters 
of the Baltic States as well as to their national identities. On the basis of national 
identities, is it possible to anticipate the capacity of the Baltic people to adapt 
themselves to the ever deepening European Union ? We can use the two Nordic 
States, Finland and Sweden, as examples in analysing this task.
The Finnish entrance into the EU reminded a lot of the Baltic cases as 
comprehensive questions like European identity and national security dominated 
people’s expectations. As the decision to join the EU was based upon a more 
comprehensive basis, the Finnish people have not lost their confidence in integration 
despite of the fact that a number of the more detailed expectations have not been 
fulfilled. The idea of a Finnish withdrawal from the EU does not form a political 
topic in Finland at all. Taking already part in the EMU Finland, on the contrary, is 




























































































In Sweden, the decision to join the EU was based upon more everyday short 
term expectations which, when not having been fulfilled, have caused an increasing 
criticism of the EU membership. The Swedes, in general, are much more sceptical 
when it comes to the net value of their EU membership. Their decision to stay 
outside the EMU reflects the fact that integration is not perceived as a 
comprehensive solution for the country as it is in the Finnish case.
On the basis of this, there is reason to believe that despite of all those 
difficulties that the EU membership undoubtedly will cause to the Baltic States, their 
firm aspirations of belonging to the Western Community will carry the people 
through them. And if the EU will be a disappointment to the Balts they will perhaps 
be more inclined to change it than to resign the Union.
Dr. Teija Tiilikainen 
Department of Political Science 
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